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Events are center stage in several fields of psychological research. There is a 
long tradition in the study of event perception, event recognition, event 
memory, event conceptualization and segmentation. There are studies de-
voted to the description of events in language and to their representation in 
the brain. There are also metapsychological studies aimed at assessing the 
nature of mental events or the grounding of intentional action. Outside psy-
chology, the notion of an event plays a prominent role in various areas of 
philosophy, from metaphysics to the philosophy of action and mind, as well 
as in such diverse disciplines as linguistics, literary theory, probability the-
ory, artificial intelligence, physics, and—of course—history. This plethora 
of concerns and applications is indicative of the prima facie centrality of the 
notion of an event in our conceptual scheme, but it also gives rise to some 
important methodological questions. Can we identify a core notion that is 
preserved across disciplines? Does this notion, or some such notion, corre-
spond to the pre-theoretical conception countenanced by common sense? 
Does it correspond to a genuine metaphysical category? 
1. Conceptual Tensions 
Very broad umbrella notions such as that of event, but also object and prop-
erty, are standard use in scientific practice for an obvious reason: their lati-
tude allows for interdisciplinary circulation and theoretical track-keeping. 
The linguist’s use of such notions may not cohere with (say) the vision sci-
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entist’s, and vision scientists may themselves have changed their use and 
understanding of such notions over the years.1 Yet in some broad sense we 
do expect results of research about events, objects, properties to be at least 
partially commensurable across disciplines and across time, and this is why 
researchers tend to go along with umbrella notions rather than more techni-
cally refined concepts. On the other hand, such notions are easy hostages to 
disciplinary idiosyncrasies. The proper methodological way to regard certain 
entities—or their representations—as they are “introduced” in various disci-
plines is to consider them as theoretical posits. As such, they live a life that 
is in the first instance intra-theoretical. And we can understand what they are 
and how they live only by looking at their behavior within the theory that 
posits them—for instance, their behavior vis-à-vis certain inferences that are 
sanctioned by the theory.  
There is thus a tension between the latitude of the umbrella notions and 
the invidious construal of each notion within each discipline. Latitude uni-
fies, theory-specificity divides. This is particularly striking with regard to the 
notion of an object (Casati 2005), but the notion of an event suffers from a 
similar tension. In addition, the common-sense understanding of both no-
tions is generally alive and kicking inside each of the specialized disciplines. 
In positing events as primary ingredients of semantic representation, for ex-
ample, we may be using an event concept that is deferential to common 
sense (an event is “something that happens”), but the properties of the posits 
may have little in common with those of events as described by common 
sense (the posits may be treated as mere values of bound variables). Can we 
even hope to disentangle these issues?  
The first thing to do, we submit, is to distinguish different types of no-
tion, not only for event but for any umbrella notion of the same latitude. This 
is a necessary step to avoid equivocation, if not to achieve clarity. We take it 
that a first taxonomy should include at least the following four notional 
types: 
— a pre-theoretical, common-sense (CS) notion; 
— a philosophically refined (PR) notion, where the refinement is dictated 
by endogenous a priori considerations—e.g., considerations about cer-
tain internal inconsistencies of the CS-notion; 
  
1 See Casati (1994) for a historical foray into the cognate notion of visual object. 
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— a scientifically refined (SR) notion, where the refinement is dictated by 
exogenous empirical considerations—e.g., considerations about the ex-
planatory value of event-like notions for theories of space-time; 
— a psychological notion: the I-representation (‘I’ for ‘internal) of the CS-
notion, or more generally the I-representation that subserves the expla-
nation of a number of cognitive performances.2 
Broadly speaking, we take it that PR- and SR-notions are typically intro-
duced for the purpose of refining the CS-notion, or to replace it altogether, 
whereas I-representations may contribute to an explanation of why the CS-
notion has the structure it has, among other things. We also assume that the 
CS notion may be inadequate in many a respect, and that it is precisely this 
inadequacy that opens the way to psychological inquiry. CS notions are, in 
the norm, illusions.  
To illustrate, much of today’s philosophical work in the metaphysics of 
material objects may be viewed as instantiating a refinement policy. Con-
sider the classical puzzle of the Ship of Theseus. Exactly one ship, A, left 
port, but as a result of a familiar repair/assembly process, two ships, B and 
C, docked (one consisting entirely of new parts, carefully crafted to replace 
the old ones; one consisting of the old parts, first diligently stowed, then 
diligently reassembled). In certain contexts, we are inclined to identify A 
with B, the intuition being that a persisting object can survive complete 
mereological change so long as the change is gradual and the shape is pre-
served; in other contexts we may be inclined to identify A with C instead, 
the intuition being that sameness of material constitution is also sufficient 
for persisting through time (as when we take apart a bookcase, ship it across 
country in separate batches, and put it back together). Now, of course B and 
C are not identical. So our two intuitions are inconsistent (A is B, A is C, but 
B is not C), which is to say that the CS-notion of a material object is overde-
terminate. Giving up either intuition (as in Chisholm 1973 or Wiggins 1980, 
respectively) yields a corresponding PR-notion that is immune to the contra-
diction while still partly adhering to common sense. 
By contrast, consider those theories that construe objects as the material 
content of spatio-temporal regions. Not only do such theories favor one par-
  
2 ‘I-representation’ is a term of art mutuated by Chomsky (1992a, 1992b, 2000), who 
first urged the need to keep apart notions that are in different theoretical standing. 
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tial intuition about what counts as an object (i.e., material constitution) over 
the other. They also yield a genuine replacement of the pre-theoretical CS-
notion of an object. According to the CS-notion, material objects are three-
dimensional entities that occupy space and persist through time by being 
wholly present at each moment of their existence. According to the revised 
notion, they are four-dimensional entities that extend through time just as 
they extend through space, and that persist through time by being partly lo-
cated at each moment of their existence. They have temporal parts just as 
they have spatial parts; they have spatiotemporal parts. Such a conception 
yields a PR-notion or a SR-notion, depending on the underlying motivation 
(philosophers espouse four-dimensionalism as a radical solution to the prob-
lem of change: see Sider 2001; physicists come to four-dimensionalism from 
Relativity Theory: see Balashov 1999). Either way, the revision yields a 
radical departure from common sense and determines a genuine replacement 
of the CS-notion. In fact, construed as a four-dimensional entity, an object 
acquires many of the properties that common sense attributes to events, so 
one may even view the replacement as taking place entirely within the con-
ceptual resources available to common sense, at least initially: the CS-notion 
of an object is dispensed with in favor of a notion modeled on the CS-notion 
of an event (objects are recategorized as events), which in turn may be re-
vised to fit specific theoretical desiderata. 
Coming then to events, which are our present focus, here too common 
sense endorses conflicting accounts, and revisionary policies may in fact be 
equally varied. For example, common sense typically construes events as 
concrete, dated particulars, i.e., as non-repeatable entities with a specific lo-
cation and duration: Sebastian’s stroll took place in Bologna, not in Paris, 
and it took place last Sunday, not last Saturday. But common sense also fa-
vors a conception of events as abstract, timeless universals, i.e., as repeat-
able entities that may be said to recur many times and in many places: 
Sebastian takes the same walk every Sunday, and the lecture he gave in Bo-
logna was the same he gave in Paris. These intuitions (non-repeatability vs. 
repeatability) are inconsistent, so again we can say that the CS-notion of an 
event is overdeterminate. And giving up either intuition (as in Chisholm 
1970 or Davidson 1970, respectively) yields a corresponding PR-notion that 
is immune to the contradiction while still partly adhering to common sense. 
As in the case of objects, there are, in addition, revisions that involve a 
more radical departure from the CS-notion. For example, there are philoso-
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phical theories that treat events as properties of cross-world classes of in-
dividuals (Lewis 1986a), or properties of sets of world segments (von Kut-
schera 1993), or tropes (that is, particularized properties: Bennett 1996), and 
there are non-philosophical theories that treat events as very special theoreti-
cal entities, e.g., as qualified points in space-time (General Relativity) or as 
sets of outcomes (probability theory). Whether stemming from endogenous 
or exogenous considerations, such PR- and SR-notions go far beyond com-
mon sense and determine a genuine replacement of the CS-notion, at least in 
the contexts in which these notions play an explanatory role. 
Finally, a psycholinguistic reading of formal semantics provides an ex-
ample of an explanatory policy, whereby an I-notion explains some traits of 
the CS-notion. The notion of an I-representation of events arises in response 
to the need to explain certain linguistic or logical performances, such as the 
ability to draw and recognize the validity of the inference from ‘Sebastian 
kissed Lisa on the cheek’ to ‘Sebastian kissed Lisa’. Such an inference is 
clearly valid, and its validity—it can be argued—is a matter of logic rather 
than lexical meaning: one need not know what ‘on’ or ‘cheek’ mean in order 
to reach the conclusion. Yet the inference does not wear the explanation of 
its validity on its sleeves, as it were. No sentential connective is available to 
account for the entailment between the two statements, and standard transla-
tions into first-order predicate logic are equally unable to do the job. On such 
translations, the premise would involve a three-place predicate (x kissed y 
on z) while the conclusion would involve a distinct, two-place predicate 
(x kissed y), and there simply is no logical link between two predicates ow-
ing to the number of their arguments. On the other hand, if we take the 
premise to assert that a certain event occurred (namely, a kissing between 
Sebastian and Lisa) and that it had a certain property (namely, of being on 
Lisa’s cheek), then the entailment is straightforward (Davidson 1967a). In 
other words, the inference can be explained as a form of conjunction elimi-
nation—from ‘Sebastian gave Lisa a kiss, and it was on her cheek’ to 
‘Sebastian gave Lisa a kiss’. Now, the notion of an event that is mentioned 
in this explanation is a theoretical posit. Indeed, this explanation is possible 
at the cost of increasing the domain of admissible entities, i.e., the domain of 
those entities for which an underlying representation is available, so as to 
include events—even though such entities are not explicitly represented or 
visible in the surface grammar of the relevant statements. Their representa-
tion, as posited by the theory, is an I-representation. The same goes for many 
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other patterns of logical or linguistic competence, as with statements involv-
ing naked infinitives (‘Sebastian saw Lisa cry’; see Higginbotham 1983) or 
inferences involving mixed implicit/explicit quantification (‘In every burn-
ing, oxygen is consumed. Sebastian burned some wood. Hence oxygen was 
consumed’; see Parsons 1985). In all such cases, the positing of an I-
representation of an event at the level of “logical form” contributes an ex-
planation of why certain inferences are justified and why certain statements 
mean what they mean. 
It is not important here do delve into the technical ramifications (and 
problems) involved in such accounts (see Bennett 1988 and Parsons 1990). 
What matters here is that the event notions involved in the revision of our 
pre-theoretical apparatus and the event notion involved in the semantic 
analysis of our logical and linguistic competence (for example) are of differ-
ent types. The features ascribed to their respective objects by the CS-, PR- 
and SR-notions, and by I-representations, can display a large variance. This 
is pretty obvious for the former, as PR- and SR-notions are expected to im-
prove on unsatisfactory features of CS-notions. But other misalignments are 
to be expected. The I-representation of an event may predicate things that no 
SR-notion would endorse, and that many PS-notions would reject; and there 
is no reason to suppose that the CS-notion of an event and its underlying I-
representations share significant features either. Finally, there is no reason to 
suppose that the PR- and SR-notions are aligned. Russell (1914), for exam-
ple, claimed that we only perceive events of finite extended duration and re-
fused on such grounds to accept the point-events postulated by Relativity 
Theory (though, again, his full treatment of the subject required any finite 
part of an event to qualify as an event in its own right—an assumption that is 
arguably no closer to the CS-notion than the physicist’s conception). 
2. Conceptual Interactions 
Distinguishing different types of event notions, all of which fall under the 
same umbrella as a matter of common practice, is a first necessary step to-
wards answering our initial questions. As soon as we take a closer look at 
how these notions are actually employed within the context of specific theo-
ries, we must acknowledge that the hypothesis of a unique common core can 
hardly be confirmed. Is there, however, a common core shared by all event 
notions of the same type?  
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Consider the CS-notion first. Sure enough, unless we go with the option 
of relativizing it to cultures, history, or social contexts, we may suppose that 
there is just one broad common-sense picture of the world, shared by all in-
dividuals, hence a single CS-notion of event. But we have seen that this no-
tion is both partial and incoherent, and any attempt to extract its core fea-
tures immediately turns into a revisionary process that results in a corre-
sponding SR- or PR-notion. SR-notions, in turn, are hopelessly idiosyn-
cratic: scientific theories come in such a variety and with such diverging 
purposes that it would be surprising if any of the umbrella concepts that they 
employ shared significant common traits (though the possibility remains that 
a radical reductionist program will succeed in expressing every SR-notion in 
terms of a common vocabulary subject to a unified body of laws). With re-
gards to the PR-notions, however, the question is by no means trivial: surely 
different philosophical theories will construe events differently, but that does 
not preclude the possibility that such notions share a common core of char-
acteristic features—some sort of conceptual invariants. For example, the 
conception of events as concrete particulars and their conception as abstract 
universals diverge significantly; yet they may well agree on the invariant 
that every event must involve some material objects—i.e., some “partici-
pants”— and must be involved in some relations—e.g., causal relations—
with other events. Indeed, the existence of a common core of features may 
seem plausible precisely on account of the fact that, typically, a PR-notion is 
developed in an attempt to overcome certain internal inconsistencies of the 
cognate CS-notion. And to the extent that the latter is not entirely inconsis-
tent, the ensuing variety of PR-notions need not be entirely in conflict, ei-
ther. 
As it turns out, things are more complicated than that. For one thing, we 
have already mentioned that ‘revision’ is an ambiguous word: in some cases 
it may be construed as entailing a radical departure from common sense—a 
genuine replacement of the relevant CS-notion. Secondly, and more impor-
tantly, no philosophical revision is carried out in isolation. Typically, a phi-
losopher’s endeavors proceed by taking certain CS-notions and making them 
interact with other notions. And, typically, such interactions take place 
within the context of thought experiments designed to test the descriptive 
and explanatory strengths (and limits) of the notions in question. In the case 
of events, several such conceptual interaction projects have been put for-
ward—most notably: 
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— How does the event notion interact with our understanding of causality? 
— How does it feature in causal explanations? 
— How does it interact with our concepts of time and space? 
— How does it interact with the notion of intentional action? 
— How does it interact with the notion of an object? 
— How does it interact with the concepts of identity and individuation? 
It is only by looking at such interaction projects, as opposed to the common 
CS-notion that inspires them, that we may be in a position to assess the rela-
tive similarities among the ensuing PR-notions. In the following sections, we 
review the relevant literature in this spirit. In addition, a closer look at some 
of these conceptual interactions may also be seen as providing useful heuris-
tics for other projects, such as that of contributing a better understanding of 
the CS-notions and, possibly, an explanation of such notions in terms of un-
derlying I-notions.  
Events and causation. The first two of these projects—on the interaction 
between the notion of an event and the notion of cause— provide a good il-
lustration of the difficulties involved in this task. Some authors (e.g., Kim 
1973) have argued that whereas concrete particular events seem to be neces-
sary for an analysis of causation in terms of the temporal priority of causes 
with regard to effects, abstract events (event types) seem necessary when it 
comes to analyzing causation in terms of constant conjunction of cause and 
effect (‘All events of type C are regularly followed by events of type E’), 
and also to account for the possibility of subsumption under a law. If so, 
then there would exist no single event notion able to satisfy the requirements 
of a unified theory of causality, with obvious discouraging consequences for 
the intuition that we may look at causality to identify a core ingredient 
common to all PR-notions. 
Significantly, the same consequences follow also on the so called singu-
larist conception of causation, which denies the necessity of a two-fold the-
ory of causality. On this view (Ducasse 1926), the causal relation that may 
obtain between two particular events c and e is conceptually and ontologi-
cally prior to any causal law or regularity: although c and e may instantiate a 
regularity, it is not in virtue of this instantiation that their relationship quali-
fies as causal. The supposition of recurrence would therefore be irrelevant to 
the notion of causation, and this means once again that causal efficiency 
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does not by itself identify a core feature of events common to all PR-notions 
(in particular, to the two notions under discussion— events as particulars and 
events as universals). Even those authors who attempt to reconcile the singu-
larist conception with the conception of causation as regularity, or constant 
conjunction, would reach the same conclusion. Such authors (e.g., Davidson 
1967b) draw a sharp distinction between causal relation and causal explana-
tion. The former relates concrete particular events and holds between a cause 
c and an effect e no matter how these events are described or identified. (If 
‘Sebastian’s kiss’ and ‘Sebastian’s declaration of love’ pick out the same 
event, then Sebastian’s kiss caused an uproar if and only if Sebastian’s dec-
laration of love caused an uproar.) This means that we can make true asser-
tions about singular causal transactions of the form ‘c caused e’ without 
knowing a corresponding general proposition ‘All events of type C are fol-
lowed by events of type E’. For we may pick out the events c and e without 
knowing them under the descriptions ‘C’ and ‘E’. On the other hand, such 
descriptions are relevant when it comes to providing a causal explanation of 
what happened, for the relata of a causal explanation are sentences, or state-
ments, not events. (If we have a law that says that every kiss causes an up-
roar, we don’t have an explanation of why Sebastian’s declaration of love 
caused an uproar unless we know that Sebastian’s act was a kiss, i.e., unless 
we know that his declaration of love was a kiss.) Thus, if this distinction be-
tween causal interactions and causal explanations is accepted, then again 
there is no need to posit abstract event types in addition to particular events, 
and even if such event types were posited, there would be no need to sup-
pose that they share the same causal features that characterize particular 
events: the two PR-notions would, in this respect, have nothing in common. 
Incidentally, that the terms of the causal relation are events is by itself a 
controversial philosophical tenet. There are authors who think that the 
proper causal relata are not events but facts—always (Mellor 1995) or at 
least in some cases (Vendler 1967, Bennett 1988). We say, for example, that 
the fact that the dollar fell was caused by the fact that oil had gradually be-
come more expensive, and it is difficult to account for the truth of such 
statements without taking facts (as opposed or in addition to events) at face 
value. Nor are facts the only competitors on the market. There is also a long 
tradition in the philosophy of action according to which the causal relation 
may be said to hold between agents and events (von Wright 1963, Chisholm 
1964, Bach 1980). We say, for example, that Sebastian caused a fight, or 
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that it was the sun that caused this year’s crop. Finally, there are authors who 
construe causal relata as properties (Crane 2001), or features (Dretske 
1977), or aspects (Sanford 1985), or states of affairs (Armstrong 1997), or 
situations (Menzies 1989). Obviously, once terminological issues have been 
disentangled and these terms are shown to refer to different entities, such a 
variety of views introduces considerable complications for any project de-
signed to assess the conceptual interaction between events and causality.  
Moreover, it is significant that when it comes to arguing for (or against) 
such views, philosophers tend to rely on considerations about the logical 
form of natural language sentences expressing causality and, therefore, on 
theoretical posits concerning the I-representation of events. The main argu-
ments in favor of the view that the causal relata are events are by themselves 
indicative of this tendency. For what such arguments are meant to establish 
is that reference to or quantification over events is needed in order to ac-
count for a speaker’s understanding of action and causation sentences; no 
other rendering of the logical form of such sentences could fit the bill. To 
illustrate, consider a singular causal statement such as ‘Sebastian’s kiss to 
Lisa caused an uproar’. It might be thought that such a statement can be ana-
lyzed as having the logical form of a sentential compound in which the 
predicate ‘caused’ is replaced by a connective, as in ‘There was an uproar 
because Sebastian kissed Lisa’. As Davidson (1967b) has argued, however, 
such an analysis would have to do justice to the following two intuitions. 
First, the connective ‘because’ would have to be extensional, i.e., admit of 
substitution salva veritate of co-referring singular terms: if Sebastian is 
Fred’s cousin, then the proposed paraphrase should have the same truth-
conditions as ‘There was an uproar because Fred’s cousin kissed Lisa’. Sec-
ond, the connective in question would have to be non-truth-functional, i.e., it 
should not admit of unrestricted substitution of materially equivalent sen-
tences: although ‘Sebastian strolled in Bologna’ may have the same truth-
value as ‘Sebastian kissed Lisa’, the proposed paraphrase need not have the 
same truth-value as ‘There was an uproar because Sebastian strolled in Bo-
logna’. Since these two intuitions clash with the thesis that every extensional 
connective is truth-functional (a thesis that seems to go back to Frege 1892), 
Davidson concludes that the proposed paraphrase is inadequate, i.e., that the 
statement ‘Sebastian’s kiss to Lisa caused an uproar’ cannot be analyzed as 
having the underlying logical form of a sentential compound. For Davidson 
it is a genuine relational statement, hence its semantic analysis requires that 
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we take the terms ‘John’s kiss to Lisa’ and ‘an uproar’ at face value (as 
event-referring expressions). Whether this conclusion is compelling need not 
concern us here.3 It is significant, however, that it depends so crucially on 
the need to account for the logical semantics of ordinary language state-
ments. As with the conjunction elimination argument reviewed in Section 1, 
the I-notion of an event representation is posited in order to justify a certain 
PR-notion, for the explanatory strength of the latter is tested against the need 
to explain certain linguistic or logical performances of competent speakers 
of English. 
Events and objects. Consider now the suggestion that every admissible 
PR-notion of an event will agree on there being a certain link between events 
and objects: every event must involve some “participants”. Since object is 
itself an umbrella notion, it is hard to assess the strength of this suggestion in 
generic terms. We have seen that there are PR-conceptions of material ob-
jects that are radically different from the ordinary CS-notion, for instance 
conceptions that construe objects as four-dimensional entities that extend 
across time just as they extend across space. On such radical conceptions, 
the project of testing the interaction patterns between the two notions loses 
much of its heuristic value. Indeed, some philosophers would simply deny 
that the conceptual distinction between events and objects reflects a genu-
ine metaphysical difference and would simply treat the distinction as one of 
degree: as Goodman put it, objects and events would only show a discrep-
ancy in the pattern of variance among their temporal parts—“a thing is a 
monotonous event; an event is an unstable thing” (1951: 286). Quine holds a 
similar view, when he describes both sorts of entity as species of the same 
“material inhabitant of space-time” genus (1970: 30): whereas events ap-
pear to develop fast in time, objects are relatively “firm and internally coher-
ent” and cohere only slightly and irregularly with their spatio-temporal sur-
roundings; events are short-lived, objects long-lived fillings of spatiotempo-
ral regions.  
But let us stick to the conception of objects as three-dimensional enti-
ties— arguably a more plausible conception from the perspective of com-
mon sense. How exactly should we characterize their role as event partici-
  
3 In the literature, several authors have countered Davidson’s conclusion; see e.g. Hor-
gan (1978, 1982), Needham (1988), Bennett (1988), and Mellor (1995). 
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pants? First of all, does every event require the presence of one or more ob-
jects? Some philosophers disagree, citing as counterexamples events such as 
changes in light or weather conditions (Brand 1977: 335) or, perhaps more 
plausibly, flashes and bangs (Strawson 1959: 46). On the other hand, per-
haps such counterexamples are just a sign of a parochial conception of what 
counts as a genuine object: if we allow for objects in a wider sense, then ar-
guably whenever a flash occurs there are photons that move; whenever a 
bang occurs there is air that ondulates; and so on (Bennett 1988: §5).  
Secondly, to the extent that objectless events are uncommon, so are 
eventless objects. Every object has a life, and the life of an object is an 
event. So the interesting question is not whether every event involves some 
object, or vice versa, but whether such involvement displays interesting pat-
terns. In a radical mood, one can think of the entities in one category as be-
ing metaphysically dependent on entities in the other. For instance, it has 
been claimed that events supervene on their participants: two possible 
worlds cannot be alike with respect to the truth and falsity of propositions 
concerning what objects there are and what properties they have and yet fail 
to be alike with respect to the truth and falsity of propositions concerning 
what events occur and when and where they occur (Lombard 1986). But 
then, again, a similar thesis has been put forward with respect to the depend-
ence of objects on the events in which they partake (Parsons 1991). In a 
more moderate way, one can grant equal ontological status to objects and 
events but maintain that either objects or events are primary in the order of 
thought. And here, interestingly enough, philosophers and psychologists 
tend to agree in according priority to objects. Treisman (1986), for instance, 
has argued that although both objects and events feature as “the fundamen-
tal units of conscious perceptual experience” and may be taken as “the basic 
units from which to build a descriptive system”, the primacy of objects is 
strongly supported by phenomenological considerations. And Strawson 
(1959) has claimed that a pure event-based ontology would not suffice for 
the success of our re-identifying practices, which require some stable all-
encompassing frame of reference, adequately provided by objects instead. In 
other words, in order to make reference to events in thought and language, 
thinkers and speakers must be able to make reference to objects. On the face 
of it, this is a psychological claim, anecdotally captured in the fact that ordi-
nary parlance has expressions such as ‘the birth of this person’ but not ‘the 
personification of this birth’. On the other hand, such asymmetries must be 
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carefully evaluated to the extent that objects, too, may and sometimes must 
be identified via reference to events. For example, if we track down the fa-
ther of Sebastian or the author of Waverley, it is by identifying certain events 
in the first place—of fathering and of writing, respectively (Davidson 1969; 
see also Moravcsik 1968, Lycan 1970, Tiles 1981).  
All of this suggests that the question of the respective primacy of event 
and object representations in explaining certain common-sense intuitions— 
among which the intuition according to which all events must involve some 
participants—may have to be settled at a deep level which can only be un-
earthed through empirical investigation. It may turn out that the I-repre-
sentation of an object controls the unfolding of the I-representation of an 
event; or it may turn out that there is a single I-representation, only accessed 
differently in different contexts or by different systems, which fact generates 
the intuition that events and objects are, at the common-sense level, two dis-
tinct categories (Casati 1994, 2005; Casati and Varzi 1999). Some interest-
ing and seldom noticed symmetries between the notion of an event and the 
notion of an object (Mayo 1961, Wiggins 1980) point in that direction. 
Events, time, and space.4 On many PR-conceptions, an important differ-
ence between objects and events concerns the way in which they are said to 
relate to space and time (Quinton 1979, Hacker 1982). We have already 
mentioned the fact that objects, construed as three-dimensional entities, en-
dure over time, whereas events, construed as particulars, extend over time: 
they have temporal parts. In addition, there is the fact that objects, being ma-
terial, appear to be invidiously located in space—they appear to occupy their 
spatial location—whereas events seem to tolerate co-location. To use a stan-
dard example, if a metal sphere is simultaneously rotating and getting warm, 
then its rotation and its getting warm appear to be distinct events with the 
same spatiotemporal location (Davidson 1967a).  
If events are construed as universals, of course, it is only in an indirect 
way that events can be said to extend over time: they do so whenever they 
are instantiated. But there are variants. Some authors, for instance, would go 
as far as saying that events are nothing but properties of times (Montague 
1969), or times cum description (van Benthem 1983). On the latter view, this 
morning’s rising of the sun is identified by an ordered pair 〈i, φ〉 where i is 
  
4 This paragraph and the next draw on Casati and Varzi (2002). 
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the relevant time period (corresponding to the descriptor ‘this morning’) and 
φ is the sentence ‘The sun rises’. (A more general account would construe 
events as spatiotemporal regions cum description, distinguishing e.g be-
tween this morning’s rising of the sun in London and its rising in Paris.) Of 
course, such PR-conceptions do not do justice to some features of the CS-
notion—for instance, the intuition according to which events can be per-
ceived but times cannot (Gibson 1975). The rationale for such conceptions 
lies, rather, in the fact that they can rely on fully developed theories of inter-
vals along with fully developed interval-based semantics (Cresswell 1979, 
Dowty 1979). This gives them outstanding descriptive power when it comes 
to the fine-grained interactions between events and time.  
The link between events and time has also been explored in the opposite 
direction, though. If events are assumed as a primitive ontological category, 
then one can dispense with time instants or intervals and “construe” them as 
derived entities. The most classical treatment of this sort proceeds by con-
struing time instants as maximal sets of pairwise simultaneous (or partially 
simultaneous) events (Russell 1914, Whitehead 1929, Walker 1947), but 
other treatments have been put forward. For example, it has been suggested 
that the mathematical connection between the way events are perceived to be 
ordered and the underlying temporal dimension is essentially that of a free 
construction (in the category-theoretic sense) of linear orderings from event 
orderings, induced by the binary relation x wholly precedes y (Thomason 
1989). Treatments such as these provide a reduction of time in terms of rela-
tions among events and are therefore especially germane to a relational con-
ception of time (and, more generally, of space-time). Modal variants (Forbes 
1993) as well as mereological variants (Pianesi and Varzi 1996) of such 
views are also available.  
The relation events have to space is more problematic. Construed as 
particulars, events are in space as well as in time. Sebastian’s walk took 
place in Bologna, not in Paris. But where exactly in Bologna did it take 
place? Suppose Sebastian strolled in Main Street. Is the location of the event 
provided by the whole street? By the sidewalk? By the narrow portion of the 
sidewalk that corresponds to the trajectory of the stroll? Some authors (e.g., 
Davidson 1967a, Lombard 1986) have suggested that the spatial location of 
an event is indeed given (indirectly) by the location of its participants: the 
location of Sebastian’s walk would then coincide with the sum of the regions 
of space that, at each time during the walk, are occupied by Sebastian’s 
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body. Yet this can hardly be generalized. Consider Brutus’s stabbing of Cae-
sar. Did this event spread only through Brutus and Caesar? Did it spread 
through their entire bodies? (Was Brutus’s left ear involved at all in this 
event?) The CS-notion is indeterminate in such respects, and there are phi-
losophers who take this indetermination to suggest that events are not truly 
spatial entities (Hacker 1982). On the other hand, it is not unreasonable to 
say that our difficulty in answering questions about the spatial location of 
events concerns the structure of our event talk, not the ontological make-up 
of events (Quine 1985, Lewis 1986b). According to this account, there are 
plenty of events out there, lots of things happening (each with precise spatio-
temporal boundaries), but which ones among them correspond to the words 
that we use may be semantically indeterminate. When we speak of Sebas-
tian’s stroll or of Brutus’s stabbing of Caesar, we use descriptive phrases 
that are extremely poor and imprecise, because poor and imprecise is the 
specification of the relevant event participants, and it is simply preposterous 
to suppose that such descriptions should pick out a unique event. If so, how-
ever, then again we see how questions pertaining to the CS-notion as well as 
to specific PR-notions interact crucially with questions pertaining to the I-
representation of events, and the details of this interaction are no straight-
forward business (Varzi 2002, Borghini and Varzi 2005). 
This in turn raises a further question that is nicely summarized in the ti-
tle of a classic paper by Fred Dretske, ‘Can Events Move?’ (1967). When we 
say that events are in space—Dretske argues—the ‘in’ is not different from 
the ‘in’ of the spatial location of objects. Nevertheless, Dretske observes that 
events are linked to their location in a way material objects are not. A chair 
can be said to be in a building (at a particular time) even though most of its 
life is spent elsewhere, whereas a picnic cannot be said to occur in a building 
if it just starts there but eventually winds up in the garden (we can at most 
say that the picnic occurs in the place which is the spatial sum of the build-
ing and the garden). The alleged reason for this asymmetry is that an event 
expression refers to the entirety of an event, and also to the event as tempo-
rally extended. It follows that there is an incompatibility between our ascrip-
tion of spatial location to events and the concept of movement—to put it in a 
catchy form, that events cannot move. This conclusion is forced upon us 
from a reflection on some features of the CS-concept of an event. However, 
as we do seem to think that event motion is all but an impossibility, the CS-
concept appears to be, once more, overdeterminate. 
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Events and individuation. Another theoretical issue that appears to be 
unresolved is the issue of identity criteria, which has been the focus of an 
intense debate (Pfeifer 1989). Was Sebastian’s walk the same event as his 
pleasant walk? Was his arm raising the same as his greeting? Some philoso-
phers take questions such as these to be metaphysical questions—questions 
whose answers call for genuine identity criteria and which must therefore be 
answered before we are allowed to take our event talk seriously. In this 
sense, different PR-notions tend to suggest different answers and the many 
answers found in the literature extend very widely—from the radical “uni-
fiers”, who take events to be as coarse-grained as objects (Quine 1950) to 
the radical “multipliers”, who take events to be as fine-grained as facts (Kim 
1966, Goldman 1970, 1971). Other philosophers, however, regard questions 
of identity to be first and foremost semantic questions—questions about the 
way we talk and about what we say. On this view, no metaphysical theory 
can include a general recipe for determining the semantics of ordinary event 
talk, hence there is no effective way of determining the truth or falsity of an 
event identity statement exclusively on the basis of one’s metaphysical 
views: what event a statement is about depends heavily (more heavily than 
with ordinary objects) on local context and unprincipled intuitions (Ben-
nett 1988). If so, then the whole identity issue is undecidable as it stems 
from the hazardous attempt to bridge the chasm between semantics and 
metaphysics.  
Once more, intuitions pull in different directions according to the con-
text in which the event notion is made to interact. Inserting events in a causal 
explanation context favors fine-grained intuitions: it isn’t just Sebastian’s 
arm raising, but his greet that made Lisa smile. Inserting events in a spatio-
temporal context favors coarse-grained intuitions: Sebastian’s greet happens 
exactly where his arm-raising occurs. Accordingly, multipliers and unifiers 
have privileged either class of contexts when formulating arguments for 
their respective positions. Goldman (2007) suggests a cognitive resolution of 
the debate that could be framed in the following way. The CS-notion of an 
event—if there is one—is overdeterminate, and the overdetermination is ex-
plained by two underlying I-representations of events. There is a perceptual 
I-representation of events that is movement-based (or change-based), hence 
based mostly on spatial and temporal features, yielding coarse-grained indi-
viduation; and there is a conceptual I-representation of events that is prop-
erty or fact-based, yielding fine-grained individuation.  
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3. Conclusions 
The concept of an event, and of event representation, is an umbrella notion. 
We should therefore speak about a plurality of concepts. We have provided 
an overview of different ways events have been dealt with in philosophy and 
in linguistics and, to a minor extent, in cognitive science. This variety of po-
sitions has been construed in part as the result of different descriptive and 
explanatory projects. In particular, we have urged that various types of no-
tion be kept apart: common-sense, theoretically revised, scientific, and inter-
nalist psychological notions. The philosophical literature has applied the 
standard test of making different notions interact; the interactions of the no-
tion of an event with neighboring notions, such as that of an object, of cause, 
of space and time, have been tested. Results so far are not conclusive. Con-
textual effects abound that can pull intuitions in very different directions. 
And the methodology itself is largely based on material that may be in need 
of close scrutiny, as it draws from linguistic evidence, non-linguistic intui-
tions, and sometimes examples from scientific descriptions of the external 
world. 
On top of these largely methodological distinctions, the philosophical 
project of analyzing the event notion can be regarded as a contribution to 
psychology in the following (admittedly limited) sense. Philosophers in gen-
eral articulate the CS-notion of an event by drawing on inferences that in-
volve the concept of an event. This applies specifically to one particular 
brand of philosophy, so-called ‘descriptive metaphysics’ (Strawson 1959, 
Goldman 1992), whose declared aim is to spell out the content of our pre-
reflective thought or perception of the world, hence, in our terms, the struc-
ture of CS-representations. Descriptive metaphysicians claim, for instance, 
that both objects and events are denizens of the world. By contrast, other 
brands of metaphysics have heralded revisions of the CS-notion, in particu-
lar under the pressure of scientific reconceptualizations of the world. In 
some cases, this has resulted in no less than a complete obliteration of the 
distinction between ojects and events. The contrast between the opposing 
claims, however, may be only seeming, for the theoretical demands on the 
notions of an event may diverge in different theories. For instance, Russell 
and Whitehead looked for a general theory of entities in space-time under 
the pressure of the new scientific image propounded by Relativity Theory. 
Admittedly, these are hardly issues that are likely to move the scholar of CS-
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notions, as CS-notions have evolved under evolutionary pressure and were 
not meant to address scientific changes.  
Arguably the revisions of the CS-notion have an import for psychology 
in the sense that they could be read as “warnings” about aspects of the CS-
notion that could reflect just how a particular module of the cognitive appa-
ratus contributed to the content of that very notion. If events really are not a 
distinct category from objects according to a PR-notion of an event, then 
there are good reasons to think that the CS-notion of an event is a form of 
illusion. The illusory aspects are precisely, then, those the PR-notion tries to 
expunge. This approach is expected to predict effects in the various interac-
tions that the notion of an event has with other notions on our list (causality, 
objecthood, etc.). The study of these interactions could provide templates for 
empirical investigations into the underlying I-notions that explain why cer-
tain illusions occur at the level of the CS-notion. In particular, it would be 
worth investigating closely at the I-level the relationships between represen-
tations of events, of objects, of regions of space, without prejudging the pos-
sibility that some of these notions are disposed of in terms of other, deeper I-
representations. (It may for instance turn out that the CS-notions of event 
and object are deep down tributary to a single I-representation; Casati 1995).  
There are some consequences for philosophers as well. Contrary to the 
received view, the exact balancing of the philosophical issues involving the 
different notions at stake could be—to a surprising extent—a matter of em-
pirical discovery.  
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